| Copyright American Association for the Advancement
of Science Feb 6, 1998
Traditional management of fisheries aims to optimize the catch of
certain economically important species by commercial fishing boats, but
this goal often eventually results in the collapse of the targeted species
itself. We have excellent long-term data documenting this process for some
fisheries. (See report on page 860 and news story on page 809.) But what
is happening to the hundreds of noncommercial species taken incidentally
or by poaching or ghost fishing by lost or abandoned gear? There is
virtually no information. In addition, thousands of square kilometers of
benthic habitat and invertebrate communities have been obliterated by
trawling (see the figure), and recreational fishing and poaching have
massively altered many coastal marine communities.
One irreparable consequence of this widespread damage is the loss of
the opportunity to study and understand intact communities: In most cases
there are no descriptions of the pristine habitats. The damage is so
pervasive that it may be impossible ever to know or reconstruct the
ecosystem. In fact, each succeeding generation of biologists has markedly
different expectations of what is natural, because they study increasingly
altered systems that bear less and less resemblance to the former,
preexploitation versions. This loss of perspective is accompanied by fewer
direct human experiences (or even memories) of once undisturbed systems.
The effects of humans sometimes result in cascading ecological changes-a
void often in part filled with introduced or inappropriate impostors that
replace and mask the traces of the former natural system-but the species
often simply disappear, leaving no conspicuous effect on the community. As
with the loss of human cultures and languages after the passing of the
elders with their wisdom, so too is humanity losing the evolutionary
wisdom found in intact ecosystems.
How can society stop the alteration of these previously diverse and
productive habitats? It is first necessary to recognize a fundamental
problem: Unlike other effects of private interests on the resources of the
general public, fishing often is considered a right not a privilege.
Regulations often are barely tolerated by the fishing community, and
poaching is rampant and minimally penalized. Management of fisheries has
typically aimed to maximize the number of fish caught, while allowing
little safety margin for assessment error, interannual variability in
recruitment of young fish, or other factors such as El Nino and diseases.
The countless species incidentally killed are usually ignored-unless they
are also of commercial or recreational value, or are protected by the
Endangered Species Act or the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Even the
marginal protection afforded by these regulations are impeded by
controversies and may take more than a decade to implement.
The challenge to management of any wild resource is to provide a buffer
for uncertainties to safeguard the future health of the population or
ecosystem. Appropriate application of available statistical techniques
could allow such buffering. The statistical method of power analysis is
appropriate and well understood, but rarely used. In this analysis, the
consequences of making errors of two types (type I and type II) when
testing the null hypothesis of no effect are clearly determined and
stated. If the conclusion is that there is an effect when in fact none
exists, a type I error results. However, if the null hypothesis is not
rejected when in fact an impact does exist, a type II error results (1).
| [Photograph] |
| A type II error? An extensive bed of Atrina
zealandica (a pinniad bivalve) (left) was decimated by commercial
dredging for scallops (right). |
Consider a proposal to restrict trawling from some areas in the Gulf of
Maine to protect benthic habitat. If the proposal is accepted and fishing
is restricted, when in fact it has no serious impact, it would be a type I
error; however, if the proposal is rejected and trawling results in
habitat destruction, a type II error is made. Current management focuses
on reducing the type I error because this kind of error results in
catching fewer than the maximum number of fish and is therefore highly
visible to politicians and the fishing industry; management virtually
ignores the type II error, principally because the deleterious effects are
not immediately obvious. But ignoring the type II error results in failure
to recognize and avoid serious long-term damage such as the collapse of
the fisheries or environmental destruction. Scientific advice should be
explicit about both types of errors, and most importantly, it must
articulate the consequences to the ecosystem of making each type of error.
The environmental consequences from type II error are much more serious
because of the great time lags in the recovery of ecosystems or animal
populations. Type I errors usually result only in short-term economic
costs.
Proper management that weights both types of error has proven difficult
because those profiting from the public resources are not required to
prove that their actions cause no damage. The only mechanism available to
society to protect these resources is somehow to prove actual or potential
serious impact. This is virtually impossible for many reasons. Those
defending the profiteering can argue endlessly over the accuracy of
statistics that are virtually impossible to verify without an observer on
each fishing boat or exorbitantly expensive sampling programs to generate
independent data. Implementation of restrictions may be delayed by
creating imaginative alternative explanations for the ecological damage
and demanding that these be negated before restricting exploitation.
Finally, even when presented with excellent data, regulators can simply
assert that the data are inadequate and ignore serious environmental
impacts. Resource management officials face strong economic barriers to
risk-averse strategies. These policies cannot be expected to be
implemented until the burden of proof is placed on exploiters of public
marine resources to prove that they do not cause damage rather than simply
assuming this to be the case until demonstrated otherwise. Similar
commercial use of land resources requires extensive environmental impact
studies and is carefully regulated. Continued monitoring is required, and
all data are readily accessible to the public. Our marine resources need
the same careful protection and stewardship.
In other contexts, particularly those involving human health and
safety, we routinely place the burden of proof that the intervention will
not cause damage on those hoping to exploit public resources. This need to
protect against the serious type II errors is obvious for the Nuclear
Regulatory Agency, which demands an extremely high margin of safety for
the building and operation of nuclear power plants, for example. The Food
and Drug Administration too demands a large margin of safety before
approving the use of drugs in humans. Extensive testing to demonstrate the
safety of new pesticide products is required before they can go to market,
and air pollution regulations are expressly written to include an adequate
margin of safety to protect human health. If society's environmental needs
are to be protected so that future generations can also enjoy, learn, and
profit from marine ecosystems, this legal burden of proof must be applied
to our marine resources so that those hoping to exploit them must
demonstrate no ecologically significant long-term changes. If the public
hopes to preserve our marine environment, they must act quickly to change
the relevant regulations and reverse the burden of proof.
| [Reference] |
| 1. R. Peterman, Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 47, 2
(1990); R. Peterman and M. M'Gonigle, Mar. Pollut. Bull. 24, 231
(1992); B. L. Taylor and T. Gerrodette, Conserv. Biol. 7, 489
(1993); L. Thomas, ibid. 11, 276 (1997). |
| [Author Affiliation] |
| The author is at the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography, La Jolla, CA 92093-0201, USA. E-mail: pdayton@ucsd.edu
|
|