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Quarantine in
Antarctica: Amanda Sichter,
August 2004. Keywords:
Antarctica; quarantine; Madrid Protocol; introduced species; introduced
diseases; risk analysis Abstract Quarantine
provisions for Antarctica have evolved over time, from the initial
Antarctic Treaty in 1959, which contained no mention of introduced species
or diseases, to increasingly stringent exclusion provisions in the Agreed
Measures and the Madrid Protocol. All of these provisions recognise that
quarantine in Antarctica cannot be a zero-tolerance measure, but requires
an assessment of risk and the implementation of effective countermeasures.
Questions remain over whether risks are being accurately assessed and
addressed and whether effective countermeasures to minimise the risk of
introductions to Antarctica are being implemented. Risk analysis indicates
that the banning of poultry products should be considered in Antarctica,
due to the possibility of mass mortality in bird species if a disease is
introduced, as well as more stringent conditions being placed on the
importation of soil and domestic plants. While a small number of Antarctic
Treaty System members have implemented strict quarantine procedures for
vessels travelling to Antarctica, there is a lack of will in the ATS
itself to address this issue, primarily due to concerns about the capacity
for departure states to enforce quarantine measures under international
law. The capacity exists, however, for ATS to encourage the implementation
of more effective measures through gateway states and recommendations for
these measures are discussed. Introduction The
implementation of quarantine regulations in Antarctica has evolved since
humans first set foot on the continent in 1821. During the initial period
of exploitation for sealing and whaling, sheep, pigs, reindeer and cattle
were imported to sub-Antarctic islands to provide food for sailors
(Chapuis et al., 1994)
, with no concern for the Antarctic
ecosystem. This attitude continued through the Heroic Age with, for
example, both Scott and Shackleton importing ponies and associated forage
to the continent
(McGonigal & Woodworth, 2001)
and onwards, with sledge dogs being a
vital part of many expeditions. It wasn't surprising, therefore, that when
the Antarctic Treaty (the Treaty) was signed in 1959, there was no mention
of quarantine provisions or preventing the importation of non-indigenous
species. By
the time the Agreed Measures for the
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora (the Agreed Measures) were
drawn up in 1964, attitudes to introduced species were changing and the
introduction of non-indigenous species to Antarctica began to be
controlled. Article IX of the Measures stated that Participating
Governments shall prohibit the importation of any species of animal or
plant not indigenous to the area, except in accordance with a permit.
Permits were limited to allowing the importation of vaccinated sledge
dogs, domestic animals and plants and laboratory animals and plants
including viruses, bacteria, yeasts and fungi. These provisions did not
apply to the importation of food, as long as animals and plants were kept
under controlled conditions. In a concession to the risk of avian
diseases, however, live poultry were not allowed to be brought onto the
continent after 1 July 1966. The
Measures regarding quarantining Antarctica were updated on the signing of
the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol) in 1991 and
far greater attention was paid to the risks of introducing species and
diseases. Measures for banning introduction of non-native species were
addressed in Article 4 of Annex II to the Protocol. Under these provisions
dogs were to be removed from the continent from April 1, 1994. Domestic
animals were removed from the list of permitted imports and all live
birds, including poultry, were banned from importation. Appendix C
required that the introduction of non-sterile soil was to be avoided to
the maximum extent practicable, reducing the risk of importing pathogens,
invertebrates and plant propagules. Food, again, was excluded from the
provisions relating to importation, although no live animals were now
allowed to be kept for food. Although
the quarantine provisions in the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) have been
improved over time questions still remain about whether these provisions
are effective in addressing the risk to the Antarctic continent through
the accidental or deliberate introduction of non-native species or
diseases. This question
relates both to the provisions themselves and their implementation by the
members of the ATS, particularly for those nations that could be described
as "gateway states" where the majority of ship and air-based
transportation to Antarctica is sourced. Finally, the level of interest of
the ATS itself as a multilateral organisation, through SCAR, the CEP and
ATCMs, in the effectiveness of quarantine needs to be addressed in the
context of how it guides the interests of its members. The
nature of quarantine regulation The
approach taken to quarantine regulation in most countries is encapsulated
in the introduction to the 1992 Australian Quarantine Services policy. It
states that quarantine provides: "protection
against the entry . . . of unwanted pests and diseases, while permitting the
international flow of goods and people to continue as freely as possible.
This is achieved by identifying the source and biological nature of the
threat, assessing the actual risk .
. . , and deciding upon and implementing the countermeasures deemed to be
possible, realistic and justified."
(Johanson, 1992)
As can be seen from this, quarantine is not based on a zero-tolerance approach and is not intended to prevent the flow of goods or people into a country. It is a risk-based approach, that requires an appraisal of the level of risk relevant to both the imported organism and the country to which it is being imported, and then requires the implementation of realistic countermeasures. Thus, to apply effective quarantine measures to Antarctica requires a level of understanding of the susceptibility of the continent to introductions, an assessment of the level of risk relevant to each planned introduction and an evaluation of the effectiveness of possible countermeasures. Antarctica
is often described as a pristine continent, thought to contain little more
than penguins and seals, and without the harmful ecological effects of
human impact seen on every other continent. This image is not one based in
reality. Antarctica and its biota has been affected by the depletion of
the ozone layer
(Bischof
et al., 1998)
, climate change
(Smith, 2002)
, pollution from sources such as research
stations that affect both the terrestrial
(Bargagli
et al., 1995)
and marine
(Crockett & White, 2003; Hughes &
Blenkharn, 2003)
environments as well as pollution that has made its way to Antarctica
from the industrialised world
(Sarkar
et al., 1994; Weber & Goerke, 2003; Goerke
et al., 2004)
. All of these human-mediated changes have, through the effects of
stress on their immune system and reduction in their ability to compete,
increased the vulnerability of the Antarctic biota to both introduced
species and introduced diseases. Even
so, it has long been held that, due to the harsh conditions on the
Antarctic mainland, few introduced species could survive
(Johanson, 1992)
. This assumption is coming under attack
through the discovery of introduced species that survive one or more
Antarctic winters. Experimental plantings undertaken by various
expeditioners were collated by Lewis-Smith
(1996)
and a number of potentially invasive
species, such as the grass Poa annua
were found to survive more than one winter on Antarctic islands. Marine
introductions have occurred, with a Northern Hemisphere spider crab Hyas araneus already found in the Antarctic Peninsula
(Tavares & de Melo, 2004)
and the possibility that cosmopolitan
species such as the green algae Ulva
spp. were introduced to Antarctic waters
(Jarman, 2004)
. The risk of all introductions is
increased by climate change, with any amelioration of Antarctica's harsh
climate assisting introduced species
(Smith, 2002)
. The
risk of the introduction of disease into Antarctica has been more
difficult to determine than that of introduced species, primarily because
of a lack of baseline serological data on diseases endemic to Anarctica
(Kerry
et al., 1998)
. Evidence of infectious agents, particularly their antibodies, have
been found in a number of species. These include avian paramyxoviruses,
including Newcastle's disease virus, and avian influenza viruses in a
number of Antarctic penguin colonies
(Morgan
et al., 1978; Morgan & Westbury, 1981; Morgan & Westbury,
1988)
as well as canine distemper virus in
Antarctic seals
(Gardner
et al., 1997)
. Bacterial infections, such as Chlamydia
(Moore & Cameron, 1969)
and the spirochete Borelia burgdorferi, which causes Lyme disease
(Gauthier-Clerc
et al., 1999)
, have been found in penguins. Mass mortalities have also occurred among
both birds and seals, but the cause of infection was positively identified
in only one instance, that of avian cholera in the death of skuas on
Livingstone Island
(Parmelee
et al., 1980)
. As
can be seen, assumptions that Antarctica is either a pristine environment
requiring zero-tolerance quarantine regulations or that introduced species
and diseases could not survive in the harsh Antarctic environment are both
incorrect. The risks to the Antarctic ecosystem, in relation to introduced
species and diseases, are high. Introduced species, particularly with any
rise in temperature, would be able to quickly invade ice-free areas and
overwhelm the fragile local ecology. The risk of diseases is even higher.
With few native bird and seal species and the possibility of low
resistance to virulent diseases, mass mortality events could occur upon
the introduction of any novel pathogen. The
Madrid Protocol: are the Provisions sufficient to address the risks? The
provisions of the Madrid Protocol seek to assess and address some of the
risks of introduced species in Antarctica. The provisions do, however,
allow for the importation of a number of products that may create a
substantial risk to the Antarctic environment. These include poultry
products, soil and domestic plants, each of which can be imported under
certain conditions. Under
Appendix C poultry products are allowed to be imported where they have
been inspected for evidence of disease, such as Newcastle's Disease,
tuberculosis and yeast infection and all products not consumed must be
destroyed by incineration or an equivalent method that eliminates risk to
native flora and fauna. These protocols do provide some amelioration of
the level of risk for the introduction of avian diseases, but they are
almost certainly not sufficient to remove risk. It has been a long-held
practice at some stations to feed poultry scraps to skuas and chicken
bones have been found in skua nests
(Kerry
et al., 1998)
. Some countries, not including Australia, also allow poultry to be
taken to field camps, where the facilities are not available to destroy
any scraps
(Pfennigwerth, 2000)
. These practices would not increase risk
if it was guaranteed that all scraps were free of disease but the practice
of visually inspecting poultry to find evidence of disease is not
sufficient to detect all infections. For example, Newcastle's Disease, a
particularly virulent infection found in many Antarctic Treaty member
countries, cannot always be detected by visual inspection. Many avian
diseases can remain infective for long periods of time in cold conditions,
(Kouwenhoven, 1995; in Pfennigwerth,
2000)
increasing the risk of cross-infection
to native birds. While the infection risk from each piece of poultry may
be very low, the fact that large amounts of poultry are imported to
Antarctica each year means that the overall risk of an infected piece of
poultry coming into contact with a native bird is quite high, and could
lead to a mass mortality event. To remove this risk, the banning of
poultry products from Antarctica should be considered. The
importation of soil into Antarctica is a particularly insidious form of
risk. The complete sterilisation of soil is rarely successful, leaving the
risk that any importation of soil creates the risk of also importing plant
propagules, invertebrate species and pathogens for both human and animal
disease
(Greenslade, 2002)
. Although the provisions seek to
minimise the importation of non-sterile soil, they could be strengthened
by the insertion of defined areas where soil could be used. The only use
for imported soil should be within greenhouses for food production. An
addition to the provisions that explicitly states that imported soil can
only be used in controlled conditions in an enclosed area would
substantially reduce the risk of introducing non-native species. Similarly,
a modification in the provisions would address many of the risks relating
to domestic plants. There is no definition of domestic plant included in
the Madrid Protocol. This leaves the matter of importation of crops or
pot-plants up to the discretion of each country, introducing what may be
an unacceptable level of risk. The possibility exists that some countries
may consider plants that may survive and thrive in Antarctica to be
domestic species, suitable for cultivation for food or pot-plants on
station. It would be almost impossible for any definition of domestic
plant to be included in the Madrid Protocol that would adequately address
this issue, due to the variety of plants that may be imported. The system
suggested in the Australian National Weeds Strategy, where characteristics
of plants that are indicative of the ability to invade are allocated
points and any importations that exceed a certain number of points are not
permitted, could be utilised in Antarctica
(ARMCANZ, 1999)
. Such a scale could be determined by the
Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR), based on such criteria
as plant type, reproductive capacity and environmental tolerances. The
Madrid Protocol could be modified so that the importation of any domestic
plants that exceed a certain points total could be banned.
Implementation of the Madrid Protocol in Australia This
practice of separately implementing Antarctic protection legislation
severely hampers the ability of the Australian government to effectively
police the Madrid Protocol provisions. The main difficulty relates to the
separation of what are, essentially, quarantine provisions from the
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS). The AAD does not have
the capacity to effectively police these measures in research vessels
travelling to Antarctica, primarily through the lack of both
infrastructure and experience in conducting quarantine inspections. The
capacity of AAD to police tourist or private vessels travelling to
Antarctica would also have to be in question. While station leaders are
appointed as inspectors under the AT(EP)
Act this does not provide a pro-active capacity to address quarantine
issues nor indicate any level of expertise
(Fletcher, 1995)
. The
AAD has sought to address this issue through the implementation of a
Memorandum of Understanding between AAD and AQIS to allow for a thorough
quarantine inspection of AAD vessels prior to their departure to
Antarctica
(Potter, 2002)
. They
have tightened their procedures considerably since 1992, when there was
little effective quarantine control
(Johanson, 1992)
. The AAD was also responsible for
hosting the Diseases in Antarctic Wildlife conference in 1998 and made a
number of recommendations to reduce disease risks, including tightening
control of quarantine in gateway states
(Kerry
et al., 1998)
. They have also sought to raise the issues at Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) through the introduction of Information
Papers on their quarantine procedures
(Information Paper 71, 2004)
. Despite
the pro-active approach taken by the AAD, there remains several areas for
improvement, which would require action at the federal government level.
Penalties for breaching the provisions relating to introduced species are
much lower than those in place for similar offences under Section 67 of
the Australian Quarantine Act 1908,
where importation of banned species can lead to 10 years imprisonment. An
increase in penalty for deliberate introductions to a similar level and a
corresponding increase in financial penalty is required to underline the
severity of these offences. There should also be action taken by the
government to share responsibility for Antarctic quarantine between AAD
and AQIS, with the creation of a small unit in AQIS that can liaise with
the AAD. This would allow AQIS to use their infrastructure and experience
to inspect not only the AAD's research vessels but to inspect all vessels
travelling to Antarctica. As this is a decision based purely on the
departmental responsibility for implementation of the AT(EP)
Act it does not require any change in legislation, simply a
ministerial decision. Implementation of the Madrid Protocol outside Australia The
implementation of the Madrid Protocol outside Australia appears to be
based on the same general structure as that in Australia, with specific
legislation implemented to provide a domestic framework for Treaty
provisions. Both New Zealand and United States, for example, have separate
Acts that implement the provisions relating to Antarctica, New Zealand
having the Antarctica (Environmental
Protection) Act 1994 and the US the Antarctic Conservation Act 1978 (amended by the Antarctic
Science, Tourism and Conservation Act 1996 to include the Madrid
Protocol Provisions). This again leads to the same problem found in
Australia where there is a disconnect between the Quarantine Service and
the Antarctic provisions. This leaves adherence to the Protocol in the
hands of departments that may have little experience in enforcing
quarantine provisions and at the discretion of the country and its
determination of the level of importance of quarantine. In
some cases, the adherence to quarantine regimes can be very strict. New
Zealand, for example, appears to have implemented strict quarantine
controls for vessels leaving from Christchurch. This extends not just to
research vessels but to tourist vessels, with New Zealand implementing a
regime where inspectors must travel on board tourist vessels to ensure
compliance with Antarctic Treaty provisions
(Information Paper 23, 2004)
. Similarly, South Africa seems to have
implemented strict quarantine procedures, based on the measures it takes
to reduce introductions between sub-Antarctic islands
(Slabber & Chown, 2002)
. This stringency does not apply to all
countries with Argentina, for example, seeming to have a much more relaxed
approach to quarantine and inspection measures
(Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties,
1997)
. The
level of importance that countries place upon quarantine can be at least
partially determined by the activities they undertaken in regards to
environmental monitoring. Australia is the only country that is monitoring
introduced species and diseases as well as seeking to determine if species
of fungi are introduced or endemic
(COMNAP, 2003)
. As the majority of successful
introductions would undoubtedly occur on and around the Peninsula, the
lack of such monitoring by nations with stations in these areas indicates
a low level of interest in the damage caused by introduced species. This
indicates that the quarantine regimes in those nations may be of a level
far lower than that of Australia and may increase the risk of introduced
species and diseases in Antarctica. Port Facilities The
Disease in Antarctic Wildlife conference in 1998 recommended that standard
quarantine practices should be applied to both inter and intra-continental
travel and that these may be made more effective by being applied at
"gateway states"
(Kerry
et al., 1998)
. This matter was referred through SCAR to be addressed at the next ATCM.
SCAR referred to the quarantine as an "extreme" measure that
should not necessarily be implemented as it considered the risk of disease
introduction to be low
(SCAR, 1998)
. Unsurprisingly, based on this
recommendation from SCAR, the ATCM XXIII did not recommend the
implementation of gateway state procedures
(Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties,
1999)
. This is consistent with the position on
previous papers on departure/port state jurisdictions
(Working Paper 16, 1997; Working Paper
22, 1997)
where the ATS has been of a view that,
under international law, departure states cannot impose quarantine
inspections on ships of another flag state and thus, any gateway state
procedures could not be upheld under international law
(Australian Antarctic Division, 2004)
. This
indicates that both SCAR and the ATCM have misunderstood the level of risk
relating to introduced diseases and thus, species. SCAR considers that the
introduction of disease is a low risk but do not comment on the
possibility of catastrophic collapses in bird or seal populations that may
arise due to such a "low-risk" introduction. It is the extreme
result that may occur from a low-risk introduction that should be driving
the implementation of quarantine measures. Similarly, the ATCM has placed
the idea of gateway states within an enforceable international law context
instead of seeking to create standard guidelines for quarantine practices
that could apply across all gateway states. Nor does it take into account
the considerable goodwill of Antarctic-going vessels who will mostly
happily accept quarantine inspections from port states
(Working Paper 22, 1997)
. The provision of expertise or
assistance with monetary or infrastructure needs from ATCM members to
gateway states, particularly Argentina and Chile where the majority of
tourist ships depart, would be of considerably more value than a change to
the Treaty regime. The Antarctic Treaty System Approach to Quarantine Quarantine
in Antarctica is a high priority issue and has been accepted as such by a
small number of member nations such as Australia. These nations are taking
steps to try and reduce the incidence of non-indigenous introductions to
the continent. The risk to Antarctic ecosystems through introduced species
and diseases are extreme and quarantine to prevent introductions should be
an issue that is pursued through the ATS. There
is little evidence to suggest, however, that quarantine procedures are
provided any level of priority in the ATS. There is little discussion of
quarantine procedures in ATCMs and that which there is, is often negative.
Quarantine issues are seen through the prism of international law in ATCMs
and accepted as too difficult, either because of an inability to implement
a gateway state system or because it is seen as seeking to punish an
action before it has occurred. SCAR has taken the approach that there is
little risk from introductions, including diseases, and has described
quarantine as an extreme measure. There is also little effort made by most
member states to monitor introduced species in Antarctica. This
lack of priority in the ATS translates through to a poor attitude to
quarantine by many member states. Legislation is disjointed from
quarantine infrastructure and special efforts must be made to address this
problem. There is no attempt to provide standard guidelines for members to
follow, nor is there any discussion on providing infrastructure, expertise
or monetary support to gateway states. The lack of support for the
provisions of the Madrid Protocol within the ATS is noticeable and leads
to increased risk for the Antarctic ecosystem through the introduction of
non-indigenous species. It is unfortunate that this risk seems to be
occurring through lack of will on the part of the ATS rather than any
logistical or legal problems that may need to be overcome. Conclusions and Recommendations Quarantine
in Antarctica is an important tool that should be utilised to reduce the
risk of importation of non-indigenous species or pathogens. Antarctica is
an isolated continent and is likely to have low levels of tolerance to
introduced species. Native species are already undergoing stress through
human changes to their environment and are more likely to be damaged by
disease or competition from introduced species. While the overall chance
of a successful introduction may be low, due to the extreme environmental
conditions, the catastrophic consequences that may arise mean that
introductions should be treated as a high-priority risk. A
zero-tolerance approach to quarantine is not possible, nor is it advocated
here. The impossibility of preventing the introduction of micro-organisms
and the prohibitive cost of addressing all possible vectors means that
quarantine should be based on minimising risk within a practical framework
of expenses and effort. This framework should be a standard one, based on
recommendations from SCAR and incorporated into the Madrid Protocol to
provide guidance for all member states on best practices. These changes
could then be implemented into domestic law. It is only by correctly
identifying risk and addressing it adequately that Antarctica can be
protected from the damage caused by introduced species. It
is on the basis of adequately identifying risk and seeking to address it
within the framework of the ATS that the following recommendations are
made: 1)
That poultry products be banned from the Antarctic continent. 2)
That all soil imported to the Antarctic continent should be used
only in controlled circumstances such as within greenhouses or hydroponic
sheds. 3)
That SCAR implements a rating scale for domestic plants, assessing
the likelihood of a plant becoming invasive in Antarctica. That this
rating scale be incorporated into the definition of domestic plants and
that no plant that is found to be a possible Antarctic weed by this scale
is permitted to be imported into Antarctica. 4)
That the Australian government amends the penalty provisions of the
Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) Act 1980 to increase
penalties for deliberate importation of non-indigenous species to
Antarctica to be equivalent to those in the Quarantine
Act 1908. 5)
That the Australian government moves responsibility for the
implementation of the Antarctic
Treaty (Environment Protection) Act 1980 from the Australian Antarctic
Division to the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service. 6)
That SCAR encourages the identification and monitoring of
introduced species in Antarctica as part of all member's Environmental
Monitoring Programs. 7)
That SCAR encourages the collection and collation of baseline
serological data on native species to allow for swift determination of the
origin of pathogens in mass mortality events. 8)
That the ATS investigates the possibility of providing standard
guidelines to all members on quarantine regimes for both scientific and
commercial vessels travelling to Antarctica. 9)
That the ATS investigates the possibility of providing assistance
in expertise, infrastructure and monetary terms to gateway states for
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